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Abstract: This paper investigates different methodologies for computing effective 
corporate tax rates. All methodologies present strengths and shortcomings, as well as 
different rankings of countries. One reason lies in the fact that different 
methodologies measure different things. This paper also computes effective corporate 
taxation for eleven European countries, the US, and Japan using financial statements 
of companies. It indicates that there are large differences between statutory and 
effective taxation, as well as between countries for different sectors and companies' 
sizes. Finally, it suggests that effective corporate taxation is sensitive to the business 
cycle. 
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Introduction. 
 
Comparing tax systems is important for economic agents since taxes affect their 
decisions. When locating or doing business, companies assess tax consequences of 
their actions. Most surveys approach the question by comparing statutory corporate 
tax rates. Nevertheless, given the complexity and the diversity of elements composing 
the tax base, this approach has been deemed to be unsatisfactory. Statutory rates do 
not perfectly reflect the tax burden of companies and economists had to come up with 
measures of effective corporate taxation. Effective corporate tax rates are important 
for different reasons. First, comparing statutory and effective tax rates gives an idea of 
tax incentives given by authorities. These incentives can be either a lower tax base or 
a lack of enforcement. Second, the comparison of effective tax rates across countries 
gives indications whether there are substantially different tax treatments of companies 
with the same characteristics but located in different countries. These figures can 
indicate whether or not a large dispersion in statutory tax rates may hide little 
differences in effective taxation. Indeed, countries with high statutory rates can lower 
the base and/or decrease tax enforcement. The analysis of effective corporate taxation 
should shed light on how corporate tax competition functions. 
 
This paper investigates the different methodologies to compute these effective rates 
and present arguments for or against their use. It proposes a map on how and when to 
use the different methods. It differs from previous studies, which have rather opposed 
methodologies, by giving hints on how to combine them for extensive analysis. Then, 
it uses BACH database containing aggregated financial statements of companies at 
sectoral level to compute corporate effective tax rates for eleven European countries, 
the US, and Japan, with a breakdown by sectors and size. Working on financial 
statements at sector and size levels allows investigating tax differences that could not 
appear at aggregate levels. The paper extends the works of Buijink et al. (1999) 
thanks to a larger sample in terms of companies and time-period. It also uses 
individual account of companies, as opposed to consolidated (group) financial 
statements, to better assess the part of taxation which should be directly attributed to 
the country and to eliminate double accounting of items between the parent company 
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and its subsidiaries. Section one compares the different methodologies to compute 
effective corporate tax rates. Section two presents the effective corporate tax rates 
derived from BACH database. It offers first a descriptive analysis of effective taxation 
in the sample countries for different sectors and sizes. Second, it compares these 
results with previous studies. Conclusions follow. 
1. Methodologies to compute effective corporate tax rates. 
The economic literature offers different approaches to compute effective corporate tax 
rates1. Three methodologies can be distinguished that we name here the macro 
backward-looking approach, the micro backward-looking approach, and the micro 
forward-looking approach. 
 
The distinction between macro and micro approaches depends on the data used. 
Macro studies compute tax rates from aggregate macroeconomic data such as national 
accounts. Micro approaches compute these rates using elements of financial 
statements, either with a theoretical perspective or with empirical data. The distinction 
between backward-looking and forward-looking approaches is based on the type of 
information used. Backward-looking approaches use ex-post real-life data to estimate 
the tax burden that companies bear. Forward-looking approaches use statutory 
features of the tax system to assess the tax aspects of specific decisions. 
 
1.1. Macro backward-looking studies. 
Macro studies usually derive effective corporate tax rates from aggregate data 
published by national or international organisations such as the European 
Commission, the OECD, or national statistic institutes. These effective rates are 
measured as ratios of taxes paid by corporations on a measure of the tax base which 
can be the corporate gross operating surplus, or the aggregate corporate profit2. 
                                                 
1 Corporate taxation only takes into account taxes paid by companies whether corporate incomes tax, 
wealth tax, or tax on property. Taxation of capital is based on a factor of production approach, and 
includes a broader range of taxes such as withholding taxes paid by individuals on dividends, taxes 
paid by self-employed, or taxes on capital gains. The choice between corporate taxation and 
taxation of capital is a matter of research agenda. 
 
2  Some authors compute ratios of corporate income tax to GDP. We leave this methodology aside 
since, as GDP is not a good proxy for tax base, this ratio cannot be seen as a measure of effective 
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Different measures have been proposed in the literature. Mendoza et al. (1994), along 
with Gordon & Tchilinguirian (1998), proposed the ratio of taxes on profits, incomes, 
and capital gains of corporations, on the gross operating surplus of companies. 
Martinez-Mongay (1997) computed the ratio of taxes on corporations, including taxes 
on their net wealth, on gross operating surplus of corporations computed as the 
difference between the gross operating surplus of all companies and the gross 
operating surplus of unincorporated companies. 
 
The attractiveness of the approach lies in its facility. Aggregate data are easily 
available from most statistical institutes, and ratios can be computed in a convenient 
and quick way. Furthermore, it is easy to compute time series to track the evolution of 
this ratio. Finally, predictions based on forecasts of aggregate data can also be 
computed without too much difficulty. These elements explain why this approach is 
commonly used. 
 
Nevertheless, these rates suffer from shortcomings due to the aggregate items they 
use. Aggregate data do not generally offer separated entries for different taxpayers or 
different recipients. This leads to different mismatching problems regarding 
numerator and denominator of the ratio. For example, corporate operating surplus 
may include interests, rents, and royalties paid by corporations while taxes on these 
sources of incomes are actually paid by private owners and do not appear in the 
numerator. Unincorporated companies are also a problem. The relatively low effective 
corporate tax rate of German companies can be explained by the fact that a large 
number of companies (about 85%) do not pay corporate taxes. Their profits fall 
instead under the personal tax code and are taxed at owners' personal income taxes. 
This leads to an underestimate of effective taxation. Another issue is that aggregate 
gross operating profit usually also includes revenues from agriculture and forestry, 
revenues from royalties or rentals, revenues from capital assets, and revenues from 
tax-exempt institutions, which blurs the results. Finally, another shortcoming of the 
methodology lies in the timing of tax collection. Since taxes levied in year t are based 
                                                                                                                                            
taxation per se but rather as a measure of tax burden. Other authors compute effective taxation of 
capital.  
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on revenues from year t-1, computing ratios for the same year can lead to 
mismatching between numerator and denominator. 
1.2. Micro forward-looking studies. 
Micro forward-looking studies encompass diverse approaches that are linked together 
by the fact that they rely on theoretical features of the tax system to compute implicit 
tax rates. In this field, the best-known method is the King and Fullerton approach, 
which draws on their well-known study "The Taxation of Income from Capital". This 
method, revisited by Devereux & Griffith (1998), looks at specific investments, using 
specific sources of financing, and derives the implicit taxation. Two measures are 
derived, the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), and the Effective Average Tax 
Rate (EATR).  
 
The EMTR is specific to a marginal investment project3 that will produce cash flows 
subject to taxation. Taxation of these investments will depend on the activity and the 
way it is financed. EMTR is computed as the ratio of the difference between pre-tax 
and post-tax return on pre-tax return. The EATR is a concept introduced by Devereux 
& Griffith for cases for which investors face a choice between mutually exclusive 
projects. Conceptually, its measure summarises "the distribution of tax rates for an 
investment project over a range of profitability4". In other words, the EATR drops the 
assumption of no economic rent. The choice of "average" as opposed to "marginal" 
may look unfortunate since "average" is not taken here in the sense of average 
taxation paid by an investor considering its profits and losses, but as the "average" 
taxation borne by an investment for different level of profitability. The term refers 
then to the investment and not to the investor. 
 
The results can then be aggregated into a model-firm approach, which uses a model 
based on industry-specific mix of assets and liabilities. The firm is supposed to carry 
                                                 
3  Technically, that is new additional projects with a marginal return on the last unit invested just 
equal to the marginal cost of the project. In other words, the Net Present Value of the Project is set 
to be zero, or the Internal rate of Return equals the market interest rate. This is based on the 
restrictive assumption of no economic rents. In other words, the pre-tax rate of return is the “value 
of marginal rates of return that equates the expected discounted present value of the future stream of 
after-tax profits with its costs net of grants and allowances, and after deducing the rate of 
depreciation” in Mendoza et al. (1994). 
 
4  Devereux & Griffith (1998), p.1. 
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out a set of investments in different assets and with different sources of financing 
whose respective weights are given. These weights are set to be identical in every 
country to isolate taxation effects. The isolation of specific tax features makes this 
methodology particularly attractive to compare domestic tax systems. Sensitivity 
analysis can also allow researchers to track the effects of specific tax features on the 
taxation of specific investments. Nevertheless, the method also suffers from 
shortcomings inherently due to the complexity of tax systems. 
 
First, this method does not allow capturing observed effective taxation and compares 
instead differences in theoretical taxation. Indeed, the already complex models usually 
don't take into account important elements of the tax base that can dramatically affect 
effective taxation. A non-exhaustive list would contain different depreciation rules, 
the existence of progressive taxation in some countries, treatment of losses (carry-
back or carry-forward), untaxed reserves and provisions, treatment of inventories 
(LIFO, FIFO, market value, cost value), reduction of values, treatment of specific 
regimes (shares buyback, capital increase, mergers, etc.), fiscal evasion and tax 
planning, rulings, share-buybacks, risk, and excess foreign tax credit positions on the 
part of multinational firms which are usually not included. Further issues that may be 
relevant such as thin capitalisation restrictions, and capital funding taxes (on 
contributions of equity capital to a firm), are usually also left out. Second, tax 
enforcement is not captured by this methodology. Lax tax enforcement can be 
collusive behaviour between taxpayer and fiscal authorities, which can be legally 
recognised5. A third problem is related to the choice of a desired after-tax of return. 
For the sake of comparison, the methodology arbitrarily fixes an after-tax rate of 
return and derives the pre-tax rate of return necessary to achieve this profitability. 
Indeed, the method is only valid for a marginal investor since the possibility of infra-
                                                                                                                                            
 
5  For example, in France, taxpayers can benefit from tax remission which can be either contentious - 
the taxpayer contests the tax accrued - or gracious - the taxpayer ask of gracious tax remission 
given its specific situation. According to the French Ministry of Finances, more than one million 
requests have been treated in 1998. For local taxes only, remissions amounted to FRF 43 billions 
(about € 6.6 billions) in 1996 (http://www.finances.gouv.fr). In Belgium, the Minister of Finances 
indicated at the Parliament that on December 31, 1999, the delay in tax payments older than one 
year amounted to BEF 732 billions (about € 18.1 billions), or about 25% of budgeted fiscal receipts. 
Out of this, BEF 216 billions (about € 5.4 billions) represented tax contentious (Minutes from 
Commission of Finances, February 6, 2001, COM 377, http://www.fed-parl.be). 
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marginal returns is not taken into account. Unfortunately, things are not the same in 
real life. The discount rate is not fixed but derived from interest rates market 
conditions, firm specific and project specific risk premiums. Therefore, in theory and 
in practice, two different projects undertaken by the same company could bear a 
different discount rate, and so could the same project undertaken by two different 
companies. Finally, the model-firm approach can also lead to misestimates in 
effective tax dispersion. Indeed, the financing and assets structure of a firm is not 
exogenous but largely influenced by taxation. By fixing weights for sources of 
financing and types of assets in which the firm invest, the model-firm approach does 
not acknowledge that firms will try to seek tax-minimizing types of financing. Taking 
a weighted average can alter differences in effective taxation. 
1.3. Micro Backward-looking studies. 
A last methodology is the micro backward-looking one. These studies use financial 
statements to derive effective corporate taxation. One usually computes ratios of tax 
accrued on other items of the balance sheet such as pre-tax profit or gross operating 
profit.  An advantage of this methodology is, like in the case of macro studies, that it 
uses real life data. This allows all the elements of taxation to be taken into account. A 
second advantage is that it makes it possible to study effective taxation at sectoral 
level and for different sizes. Finally, by carrying out regressions, the micro backward-
looking approach makes it possible to identify the items of the balance sheet that have 
a significant influence on effective corporate taxation. 
 
A shortcoming of this methodology is that it does not isolate the features of national 
tax systems. Indeed, it is not possible with this method to isolate tax characteristics 
individually and look at their separate effects. Taxes accrued indeed depend on 
multiple elements which are difficult to separate. Furthermore, it is not possible either 
to isolate the national tax system from the interference of foreign tax systems. Since 
companies do business across borders, different parts of their revenues might be taxed 
under different systems, and therefore aggregate taxes accrued does not necessarily 
depend on the home state taxation only. This changes the interpretation one should 
have from tax rates computed in this way. Effective tax rates do not in this case 
represent implicit tax rates derived from the national tax system but represent the tax 
burden that companies located in a specific country have to bear. Indeed, if companies 
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are less taxed in one country, this does not necessarily mean that this country's tax 
system is more favorable but it can for instance also be due to the fact that companies 
located in that country are able - e.g. thanks to more lenient administrative procedures 
-  to optimize their foreign investment decisions in a more efficient way.  
1.4 Summing up: comparing methodologies. 
A first starting point to compare methodologies is to see whether they use real-life 
data or use theoretical features of tax systems. The distinction we made between 
backward and forward-looking studies follows this line. If theoretical models enable 
to compare specific features of national systems, real life data have the advantage to 
incorporate various elements that are left out in forward-looking studies. In that sense, 
forward-looking studies do not compute effective (i.e. observed; actual) tax rates but 
implicit ones. Nevertheless, these backward-looking studies can't isolate national tax 
systems from influences of other foreign tax systems. One important consequence is 
that studies using the forward approach may find larger dispersion of effective tax 
rates while backward-looking approaches may find a smaller one. The reason may 
then be that companies located in high taxed countries adapt and take advantage of the 
possibilities they have to do business and invest abroad to decrease their tax burden. 
From a policy-oriented perspective, this fact brings the question whether distortions 
should be looked at the level of national tax systems or with a broader geographical 
scope. In other words, is a situation in which national tax systems are different but in 
which companies have an equal opportunity to take advantage of the possibilities 
offered by the different systems, one of distortion? Should policymakers who want to 
reduce distortions act directly on tax systems or should they rather remove barriers to 
activities abroad and let the tax competition lead to some de facto harmonisation? 
 
A second differentiation can be made on the level of aggregation they take. In theory, 
it is always possible to carry out the computations at least at sectoral level. The 
feasibility will depend on the availability of data. So far, these data seem to be only 
available using financial statements of companies. Macro studies can't compute these 
rates in practices because data on corporate taxes and operating profit are often not 
available. In that sense, the difference between macro and micro backward-looking 
studies is one of level of aggregation of data.  
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Another distinction is whether the methodology can isolate the effect of specific 
features of the tax system. The issue is mainly one of level of interaction between the 
different characteristics of a tax system. Backward-looking studies cannot tell what 
taxation would be in the absence or a change of a particular feature. Forward-looking 
studies can isolate the impact of the combination of several items on effective taxation 
but, for practicability reasons, they cannot take them all in consideration and have to 
leave some out since they cannot be introduced in a model (e.g. tax enforcement). 
Both types of studies produce effective tax rates which can be used as dependent 
variable in econometric studies trying to explain the determinants of taxation. 
Nevertheless, backward studies are superior in this field since effective tax rates from 
forward-looking studies are biased by the choice of variables used. For instance, it is 
obvious that rates built with only statutory rates and depreciation rules are likely to 
depend from these two explanatory variables. 
 
A last differentiation is whether the study investigates taxation based on the 
nationality of the tax system or on the nationality of companies. Micro forward 
looking studies look at national systems taken separately. They mainly investigate 
taxation of domestic companies in their domestic system. If they also look at tax 
treatment of operations undertaken abroad, they lack information on the importance of 
these operations in companies' turnover. Micro backward-looking studies rest on the 
nationality of companies whatever the tax systems that actually apply to their 
operations. The case of macro studies is more difficult and depends on how data are 
collected. 
 
One key message of this paper is that the different studies are actually not measuring 
the same thing even if the different measures can be linked. All approaches are correct 
from an economic point-of-view but do not give the same indicator. The question is to 
know which measure does correctly reflect what the researcher wants to measure. The 
corollary issue is that one needs to know what she/he want to measure and why. If 
she/he is interested in comparing national tax systems, trying for instance to explain 
why companies in country A favor debt over retained earnings while the opposite is 
true in country B, then the forward-looking approach is very instructive. If she/he 
want to see if companies in country A have the same average effective tax burden 
than companies in country B, then the backward-looking approaches will be useful.  
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All methods have their advantages, backward-looking approaches to detect overall 
taxation at national level, the micro forward-looking approach to detect tax 
differences for specific investment and financing decisions. For example, if one is 
interested in differences in treatment of companies in, say, the energy sector, a first 
step would be to use the backward-looking approach to compute effective tax rates. 
Some large differences can appear between, say, France and Germany. Then this 
backward-looking approach would allow computing different financial or structural 
ratios for the sector and seeing if, econometrically, these ratios have an influence on 
effective taxation. This would give the researcher suspects for explaining these tax 
differences. Imagine that we find that, say, leverage ratio and the investment in 
equipment have an influence. Then, it is useful to turn to the micro forward-looking 
approach to compute effective tax rates for investment in equipment using debt or 
equity. This method allows tracking possible differences and the source of possible 
discrimination. We therefore think that opposing both methods is a fruitless goal and 
advocate a more accurate use of these two useful tools. 
1.5. Effective corporate tax rates: a policy-oriented analysis. 
Our purpose is not to provide an exhaustive and detailed comparison of studies on 
effective corporate taxation. Given the diversity of methodologies used, the exercise 
would not make sense. Rather, we would like to stress common features or dramatic 
differences across studies. Taking a policy-oriented perspective, we have to assess the 
dispersion of results, the ranking of countries, and the neutrality of taxation across 
subsets of companies. 
a. Differences in dispersion. 
Dispersion in results will obviously depend on the countries chosen for the analysis. 
This is important since most studies usually restrict their analysis to a limited set of 
countries that either are seen as representative of some trend in taxation, or are 
important in terms of GDP. Nevertheless, macro backward-looking studies usually 
show the largest dispersion in results. For instance, Martinez-Mongay (1997) find that 
effective tax rates in 1995 ranged from 4% in Greece to 58.4% in Luxembourg. The 
same size of dispersion can be found in Gordon & Tchilinguirian (1998) as well as in 
Mendoza et al. (1994).  Micro forward-looking studies also present large dispersion, 
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although less dramatic than in the case of macro studies. In Baker&McKenzie (1999), 
effective corporate taxation in Europe ranged from 13.7% in Greece to 40.7% in 
France. Jacobs & Spengel's (1999) model-firm approach provided rates from 21.0% in 
the UK to 39.9% in France, but for a limited a set of 5 countries. Finally, Micro 
backward-looking approaches are more difficult to assess since they are less 
numerous. The main reason lays in the availability of the data. Buijink at al. (1999)'s 
study for the EU shows average effective corporate taxation for 1990-1996 ranging 
from 13.9% in Ireland to 38.5% in Germany. Its dispersion is pretty similar to the 
dispersion of micro forward-looking studies. 
 
Study  
(between brackets:  
period covered) 
Methodology 
 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Average effective 
corporate tax 
rate 
Sample size 
 
Buijink et al  
(average 1990-1996) 
Micro 
Backward 
28% 26.9% 15 (EU-15) 
Baker&McKenzie  
(1999) 
Micro 
Forward 
31% 24.3% 15 (EU-15) 
Pricewaterhousecoopers 
(1999) 
Micro 
Forward 
26% 31.5% 15 (EU-15) 
Jacobs & Spengel 
 (1999) 
Micro 
Forward 
25% 29.5% 5 (FRA, DEU, 
NLD, GBR, 
USA) 
Martinez-Mongay  
(1995) 
Macro 
Backward 
65% 22.0% 15 (EU-15) 
Martinez-Mongay  
(1995) 
Macro 
Backward 
64% 23.6% 17 (EU-15, 
JPN, USA) 
Gordon & Tchilinguirian 
(average 1985-1996) 
Macro 
Backward 
51% 32.4% 11 (JPN, USA, 
EU-15 minus 
AUT, DNK, 
GRC, IRL, 
LUX, ESP) 
Table 1: Coefficient of dispersion of some selected studies. 
 
The difference in dispersion is certainly due to methodologies differences. As 
mentioned above, the aggregate data used in macro studies clearly underestimate 
effective taxation in some specific countries, leading to a larger dispersion in results 
than in real life. Still, dispersion is of importance for policymakers since low 
dispersion can indicate de facto harmonisation of corporate taxation. Differences in 
dispersion between studies blur this analysis.  
b. Differences in ranking. 
High differences in ranking make it even more disturbing for policymakers. Indeed, 
depending on the methodology adopted, the rankings give totally different pictures of 
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which are high-tax and low-tax countries. In the following graph, we compare 
corporate effective taxation for three studies using the three different methodologies. 
To resolve the problem of difference in ratios, we set EU-15 average equals to 100. 
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Figure 1: Differences in effective corporate taxation rankings. 
 
It actually seems that ranking are method-specific. Indeed, if we run Spearman's rho 
test on the different studies, we find low correlation between studies using different 
methodologies and high correlation between the ones using the same method. This 
casts more doubts on which methods to use since the choice of a method will 
influence the ranking and the dispersion of effective taxation. 
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Null Hypothesis: independence in rankings - sample size: 15 
Study 1 Method Study 2 Method Spearman 
rho 
Conclusion 
Martinez 
(97) 
Macro 
Backward 
Baker&Mc
Kenzie (99) 
Micro 
Forward 
-0.002 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.1. 
Martinez 
(97) 
Macro 
Backward 
PriceWaterh
ouse (99) 
Micro 
Forward 
-0.314 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.1. 
Martinez 
(97) 
Macro 
Backward 
Buijink et 
al. (99) 
Micro 
Backward 
0.346 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.1. 
Buijink et 
al. (99) 
Micro 
Backward 
Baker&Mc
Kenzie (99) 
Micro 
Forward 
0.259 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.1. 
Buijink et 
al. (99) 
Micro 
Backward 
PriceWaterh
ouse (99) 
Micro 
Forward 
0.293 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.1. 
Baker&Mc
Kenzie (99) 
Micro 
Forward 
PriceWaterh
ouse (99) 
Micro 
Forward 
0.516 Reject null 
hypothesis at 0.05 
Table 2: Spearman test between different selected studies. 
c. Differences in neutrality of corporate taxation. 
Neutrality of taxation refers to possible differences in effective tax treatment across 
different sectors or sizes of companies. A tax is levied in a neutral way if there are no 
significant differences in effective taxation between different categories of companies. 
Micro forward-looking approaches don't specifically look at this problem. Indeed, 
their method is based on statutory features of the tax system and for practical reasons 
it is difficult to include differences in sectors or sizes in their models. Macro studies, 
almost by definition, don't make this disaggregation and therefore don't bring much 
help on this. Finally, only the micro backward-looking approach allows creating 
clusters of companies and assessing differences in tax treatment between them. 
 
The issue of neutrality is important. First, if statutory rates are usually the same for all 
companies, the different techniques to determine the tax base imply the intervention 
of elements which may prove to be more beneficial for some groups of companies. 
For example, the tax treatment of interest paid may favour sectors with high leverage 
ratios. The choice of depreciation systems may also influence the tax treatment of 
different sectors. Special tax regimes and tax breaks can create non-neutrality in 
taxation. Second, effective taxation may be function of the business cycle. Indeed, the 
influence of tax allowances diminish with profit and effective rates should 
theoretically tend to statutory rates.  
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profit
Statutory rate
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Figure 2: effective and statutory rates 
 
If this argument holds, then sectors with strong competition should also experience 
lower effective taxation since one may expect that more competition would reduce 
profits. Finally, there might also be difference in effective taxation between 
companies with different sizes. Indeed, one can expect larger companies to be able to 
devote larger resources to implement fiscal engineering to lower their taxation. The 
complexity of tax systems may be a cause of discrimination between large and small 
companies.  
 
The study of Buijink et al. (1999) investigates the neutrality of taxation by looking at 
the relationships between effective corporate taxation and company characteristics 
such as size, industry, R&D intensity, the average number of employees, or 
investments. Overall, their study does not find "strong evidence for specific company 
characteristics strongly influencing the level of effective tax rates6". Their conclusion 
is that corporate income tax is levied in a neutral way in the European Union. 
 
We now turn to our own computation of effective corporate taxation using BACH 
database. 
                                                 
6  Buijink et al. (1999), p. 64. 
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2. Computing effective corporate tax rates from BACH database. 
In this section, we will extent the works of Buijink et al (1999). We have opted for the 
micro backward-looking approach which, in our opinion and despite its own 
shortcomings, is, in a first step, a better approach to  assess all the aspects of effective 
corporate taxation of companies. We used the Bank for the Accounts of Companies 
Harmonised (BACH) available at the European Commission. The first two sections 
present the database and the methodology we followed. The third section presents our 
results and findings. Comparison with previous studies follows. 
2.1. Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised. 
a. General Introduction to BACH Database7. 
In 1985 the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European 
Commission started building up a databank for the annual accounts. The aim was to 
analyse the financial structures of European companies, as well as American and 
Japanese corporations. The Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised 
(hereafter BACH) presents the financial structures of non-financial companies, 
aggregated at various sectoral and size levels, in eleven Member States (hereafter 
EU*)8, the United States and Japan. Data are presented using a single accounts layout 
based on the one set in the Fourth Community company-law Directive (76/660/EEC). 
b. Variables, sectoral grouping, and size breakdown in BACH. 
Bach data is a compilation of individual (as opposed to consolidated or group) 
financial statements of companies. They are presented in a structured form. Items 
from the balance sheet are given as a percentage of total assets (which of course is 
equivalent to total liabilities plus equity), while items in the profit and loss account 
are given as a percentage of the turnover. The data base also provides absolute figures 
for total assets and turnover. Data are harmonised through the use of the single 
account layout as mentioned above.  
 
                                                 
7  European Commission (2000a), BACH user guide, July 7, 2000. 
 
8  Are missing: Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. 
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BACH also offers a sectoral disaggregation including six main sectoral grouping 
(Energy and Water, Manufacturing Industry, Building and Civil Engineering, Trade, 
Transport and Communication, and Other Services). Manufacturing and Trade also 
offer more disaggregated data. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this analysis, we stick 
to the 6 main grouping proposed by the database. Finally, the database makes it 
possible to distinguish between different sizes (small, medium, and large) following a 
turnover criterion for European companies9. 
2.2. Methodology to compute effective tax rates in BACH. 
We have used the Profit and Loss account available in BACH (all items in %-age of 
net turnover) to compute effective tax rates. We have named variables in the 
following way. 
Name PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
OI 
(operating income) 
Net turnover. 
+ (1) Change in stock finished goods and work in progress. 
 + (2) Capitalised production. 
+ (3) Other operating income. 
= TOI Total operating income. 
 - OC 
(operating cost) 
Costs of materials and consumables. 
(Raw materials and consumables + Other external charges). 
- (4) Other operating charges and taxes 
- EMPL 
(employment) 
Staff costs. 
(Wages and salaries + Social security costs). 
= GOP Gross operating profit. 
- DEPR Value adjustments on non financial assets + Depreciation on intangible and tangible fixed 
assets + Other value adjustments and provisions 
= EBIT 
(Earnings before 
interest and taxes) 
Net operating profit  
+ FININC Financial income 
                                                                                                                                            
 
9  US data only provide two sizes. 
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(financial incomes) 
+ (5) Value adjustments on financial assets 
 -FINCH 
(financial charges) 
Interest and similar charges 
(Interest paid on financial debts(INT)+ Other Financial charges) 
= EBT 
(earnings before 
taxes) 
Profit on ordinary activities before taxes 
+ EXINC Extraordinary income 
- EXCH Extraordinary charges 
- T Taxes on profit 
= NTP 
(net total profit) 
Profit or loss for the financial year 
 
Different possibilities were available to compute effective tax rates.  
 
• A first option was to compute the ratio of taxes paid on profit on ordinary 
activities before taxes adjusted for extraordinary activities:  
 
τ * = EXCHEXINCEBT T −+  . 
 
This would have been the best option to compare effective rates with statutory 
rates. Unfortunately, because this item is the result of numerous additions and 
subtractions (from turnover to tax), and because of possible differences in 
accounting rules, the use of this ratio may be problematic for comparisons. 
Indeed, the determination of profit differs from country to country and we 
therefore lack a common denominator. 
 
• A second option was to compute a ratio on a more stable denominator. The 
turnover would have been a solution:  
 
ETT = 
OI
T . 
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Unfortunately, ratios computed in this way lead to very small figures which 
makes it difficult to adequately compare countries. Furthermore, the use of the 
turnover can lead to misinterpretations because information on costs is lost. A 
small ratio does not necessarily mean that the company's profits face low taxation 
because a large turnover might be necessary to cover large costs. 
 
•  The option retained here as an alternative measurement of effective taxation is to 
compute the ratio of tax paid on gross operating surplus:  
 
τ = GOPT . 
 
This ratio is similar to the one used in macro backward looking studies such as 
Martinez-Mongay (2000). The use of gross operating surplus is interesting 
because it gives profit before depreciation. This is important to obtain a 
denominator whose definition does not differ too much from country to country. 
Indeed, depreciation rules differ not only on the linearity versus accelerated 
dimension but also on whether the historical value or the market value of the 
asset is taken into account. Therefore, taking gross operating profit allows us to 
reduce some of the problems due to differences in accounting methods. Gross 
Operating Profit is more comparable between countries than profit on ordinary 
activities.10 
 
Ratio Definition 
Effective 
Corporate Tax 
Rate 
τ = GOPT  
The effective tax rate is defined as the ratio of 
taxes paid on Gross Operating Profit. 
 
                                                 
10  A possible shortcoming of this method is the impact of financial activities on the ratio. Indeed, 
financial activity is not included in the ratio and therefore companies having a financial profit (i.e. a 
positive financial income net of charges) will have a higher effective tax ratio with our method 
since taxes paid on this income will appear in the nominator while the profit will not appear in the 
denominator. This possible shortcoming would be particularly relevant for the financial sector but 
this sector is not included in the database. 
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This rate has been computed per country, size, industry and year. The rates for the 
European Union are averages of effective corporate taxation weighted by gross value 
added in the economy. Averages for a period, an industry or a specific size have been 
computed by summing similar items over the period. These data are then used to build 
aggregate statistics for a period, an industry or for a size. 
 
For example, the effective rate for period n to n+m for Industry I and Size S is: 
τ mnn SI +→, = ∑
∑
+
=
+
=
mn
nt
SItGOP
mn
nt
SIttaxes
,,)(
,,)(
 
 
This ratio has been preferred to a weighted average of yearly effective tax rates. 
Indeed, using this latter would have created problems due to losses for some specific 
years. The ratio we have computed (total taxes paid over a long period on total gross 
operating profit over the same period) reduces this problem11. 
2.3. The BACH effective corporate tax rates. 
a. The evolution of effective corporate tax rates in the EU, the US, and Japan. 
A first step in the analysis is to compare effective corporate tax rates in the US, Japan, 
and the European Union. To allow for a better comparison, we took the 
manufacturing sector since this sector offers the best data availability12.  
                                                 
11  For example, a firm has a GOP in year t of 100 for a turnover of 400 and pays 20 of taxes. In year 
t+1, the company has a negative GOP of –10 for a turnover of 500 and pays 10 of taxes. Our ratio 
would give an effective tax rate of 33.33 % (i.e. 30/90) while a weighted average (turnover as 
weight) would give an effective tax rate of –46% (i.e. 4/9 of 20% plus 5/9 of -100%). This latter 
ratio does not represent the real picture of the firm over the whole period. 
 
12  For the European Union, we take the average of individual countries' effective tax rate weighted by 
gross value added in the manufacturing sector. Data for the European Union are partially estimated 
for 1990 and 1999. The results for the sectors of "energy and water" and "trade" - the two other 
sectors for which the USA offer data - are given in the appendix. 
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Figure 3: Effective Corporate Tax Rates - Manufacturing industry 
Source: BACH. 
 
A first look at the data seems to suggest differences in levels of effective corporate 
taxation. As seen on figure (3), taxation in Japan is consistently higher - with the 
exception of 1999 - than taxation in the US and the EU. We also see a general decline 
for the three geographic areas during the period 1987/8 - 1992/3. The trend is then a 
stabilisation followed by further decrease in Japan, an exit of a V-curve followed by 
stabilisation in the US, and a gradual increase in the EU. The important point is the 
apparent convergence of effective corporate tax rates between the three geographic 
areas in the late 90's. Another interesting finding is that low levels of taxation seem to 
correspond to periods of economic slowdown, suggesting that effective taxation might 
be driven by the business cycle. 
 
A quite similar picture is found in Martinez-Mongay (2000). Using the macro data, 
one can spot the same relative position of the three blocks and the highest and lowest 
periods of taxation to be similar. One of the few differences is the date when the 
position of the EU and the USA are inverted - 1995-1996 for Martinez-Mongay 
(2000) and 1997-1998 for this study. This may be explained by a small difference in 
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timing between the manufacturing industry we examined, and the total economy 
surveyed by Martinez-Mongay (2000). 
b. Effective corporate tax rates in the EU. 
We now turn to the analysis of the evolution of effective corporate taxation in the EU. 
In the previous section, we have identified the trend.  
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Figure 4: Weighted average of Statutory and effective Corporate Tax Rates in the sample. 
 
The reaction to the economic slowdown in 1992-1993 has generally been one of cuts 
in corporate tax rates (in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, and Greece). 
Nevertheless, as an answer to the need to reduce deficits, this period has been 
followed by increased in corporate taxation, generally by ways of tax surcharges (e.g. 
a 3% crisis tax surcharges in Belgium, a solidarity surcharge in Germany, or an 
employment surcharge in Luxembourg). This has certainly contributed to the upward 
trend in Europe from 1994 onwards. In the most recent period, namely from 1996-
1997, one has seen new corporate tax reforms (e.g. Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Denmark, and the UK). These reforms have taken the form of cut in rates 
accompanied by larger tax base. These increases in tax base coupled with better 
economic cycle seem to have counteracted the effects of smaller tax rates and left 
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companies with higher effective tax rates as suggested by figure 4. The respective 
contribution of each effect should be part of new research agenda on corporate 
taxation. More recently, new reforms are currently prepared thanks to an ease in 
budgetary position. These reforms usually also aim at decreasing statutory rates and 
enlarging tax bases. 
 
The evolution of dispersion in the EU sample is also instructive. We can identify a 
sharp decline for the period 1992-1993 and a stabilisation afterward.  
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Figure 5: Coefficient of dispersion of Effective Corporate Tax Rates - Manufacturing industry 
Source: BACH. 
 
This decrease is not surprising. Indeed, in theory, the effective tax rate is a function of 
profit and statutory tax rate Since the profit is the difference between revenues and 
costs, the effective corporate tax rate should normally show a curve which is 
increasing with revenues (marginally decreasing though) and has a horizontal 
asymptote at the statutory rate. Therefore, during periods of low economic activity, 
effective taxation tends to concentrate in levels close to zero taxation, while during 
periods of high economic activity, differences in statutory tax rates amongst countries 
are more visible. The economic slowdown in Europe around 1992-1993 can explain 
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this decrease in dispersion in effective taxation. The following stabilisation of 
dispersion around the 1993 value is nevertheless an interesting element. Effective 
taxation has followed a similar upwards trend in the different European countries, 
leaving dispersion unchanged. 
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Figure 6: Coefficient of dispersion of Statutory Corporate Tax Rates in the sample. 
 
Finally, the dispersion of statutory rates in our sample does not strictly follow the 
same trend as for effective rates. The relative stability of the dispersion during the 
whole period seems to indicate that changes in statutory tax rates have been done on 
relatively similar timespan and scale across Europe. The difference in the evolution of 
dispersion and average between statutory and effective tax rates also confirms that 
investors should not focus only on statutory rates as it is too often the case. Clearly, 
statutory tax rates are only part of the picture and tax base matters at least as much. 
c. Level of taxation. 
If we take the manufacturing industry, effective corporate taxation ranges in the EU 
from 10.2 % in Sweden to 20.4% in Germany for the period 1990-1999. The ranking 
shows Sweden, Austria, and Belgium among low tax countries, while Germany, Italy, 
and the Netherlands are among the high tax countries.  
 25
Effective Corporate Tax Rates 
Manufacturing Industry - average 90-99.
10.2 10.3
11.2 11.7
12.7 13.0 13.1
16.9 17.5
17.7
20.4
25.8
20.2
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
S
w
ed
en
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
Fi
nl
an
d
P
or
tu
ga
l
Fr
an
ce
S
pa
in
D
en
m
ar
k
Th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
U
S
A
Ita
ly
G
er
m
an
y
Ja
pa
n
%
 G
ro
ss
 O
pe
ra
tin
g 
Pr
of
it
 
Figure 7: average effective tax rate 1990-1999. 
 
Manufacturing 1990-1994 1995-1999 
Rank Country Rate Country Rate 
1 Germany 20.2 Italy 21.8 
2 Italy 17.7 Germany** 20.6 
3 Netherlands 15.9 Netherlands** 19.1 
4 Denmark 15.0 Denmark** 18.3 
5 Spain 12.3 Finland** 15.5 
6 Portugal 11.8 France 15.0 
7 France 11.0 Spain 13.5 
8 Belgium 10.6 Portugal 13.3 
9 Austria 9.8 Belgium 12.1 
10 Sweden† 9.4 Austria 10.7 
11 Finland 7.1 Sweden** 10.4 
 Average EU* 12.8 Average EU* 15.5 
 USA 14.0 USA 20.1 
 Japan 27.2 Japan 24.3 
Table 3: EU-11 ranking in manufacturing for sub-periods 1990-1994 and 1995-1999  
(†1991-1994;**:1995-1998). 
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It also appears to be interesting to compare the ranking for two sub-periods, one with 
economic slowdown and one of higher economic expansion. This is done in table 3. 
Effective taxation has increased everywhere in Europe between the two sub-periods. 
With reference to corporate taxation, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark 
are high-taxed countries, while Austria and Sweden are low taxed countries. Portugal 
stays in the middle, while Belgium keeps its place in low-intermediate range. France 
moves from low-intermediate to intermediate. Spain moves the other way around, 
mainly because its effective taxation has increased but in a smaller proportion than 
other European countries. The case of Finland is the most obvious with a move from 
the lower range to high-intermediate level. Finally, note that Japan and the US are in 
the higher range for both periods.  
 
The comparison with relative positions in other sectors provides a quite similar 
picture for most countries. 
 
Country Energy Manufac. Building Trade Transp. Oth. Ser. 
Austria Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Belgium Low-inter Low-inter High-inter Low-inter Low-inter Interm. 
Denmark High High-inter High N/A N/A N/A 
Finland Low-inter Low-inter High-inter Interm. Interm. Interm. 
France Low Interm. Interm. Low-Inter Low Interm. 
Germany N/A High High High N/A N/A 
Italy High-inter High High-inter High High High 
Japan High High High High High High 
Netherl. High-inter High-inter High-inter Interm. High-inter High 
Portugal High Interm. Low-inter N/A High N/A 
Spain Interm. Interm. Interm. Interm. Low Interm. 
Sweden Low Low Low Low Low-inter Low 
USA Interm. High-inter N/A High-inter N/A N/A 
Table 4: relative effective taxation by country and sector.  
"high", "intermediate", and "low" refer to comparison within the sector. 
 
As a conclusion, with reference to corporate taxation, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and 
the Netherlands can be seen as high-taxed countries, while Austria and Sweden can be 
depicted as low-taxed countries. The others range in the middle. 
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High-taxed Low-taxed 
Denmark 
Germany 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
Austria 
Sweden 
Table 5: low and high taxed countries 
d. Effective and statutory rates compared. 
An interesting point is to compare effective and statutory tax rates. Indeed, investors 
and policymakers typically focus on statutory tax rates while these only represent part 
of the picture.  It is sometimes argue that countries with high level of statutory rates 
compensate with lower tax base and/or lower enforcement. We reproduce in table 6 
the statutory and effective rates for 199813 in the manufacturing sector. 
Rank Country STR Rank Country ETR 
1 Germany 47.5 1 Italy 26.4 
2 France 41.6 2 Germany 24.3 
3 Belgium 40.2 3 Finland 19.2 
4 Portugal 37.4 4 Denmark 19.0 
5 Italy 37.0 5 Netherlands 17.1 
6 France 16.7 
7 Belgium 13.7 
6 Greece 
Netherlands 
Spain 
35.0 
8 Spain 13.3 
9 Portugal 13.2 9 Austria 
Denmark 
34.0 
10 Sweden 13.0 
11 Ireland 32.0 11 Austria 9.9 
12 Luxemb. 31.2 
13 UK 31.0 
14 Finland 
Sweden 
28.0 
 
Table 6: Statutory Tax Rates and Effective Tax Rates in manufacturing industry for EU countries. 
Notes: Germany: rate on non-distributed profits; all countries: including local and social surcharges. 
                                                 
13  Last year for which we have actual  (i.e. non-estimated) data for all countries. 
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We can see large differences between statutory and effective corporate tax rates14. 
These differences are exemplified by the ratio of effective to statutory tax rates as 
shown in table 7. A larger difference between both measures can be due either to 
more favourable depreciation and interest expenses deductibility rules, or lower 
enforcement of statutory rules. 
 
Rank in 
1998 
Country Etr/Str 
1998 
Etr/Str 
1996 
Etr/Str 
1994 
Etr/Str 
1992 
Etr/Str 
1990 
1 Italy 0.71 0.45 0.39 0.47 0.44 
2 Finland 0.69 0.50 0.37 0.14 0.23 
3 Denmark 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.37 0.36 
4 Germany 0.51 0.42 0.34 0.39 0.52 
5 Netherlands 0.49 0.56 0.43 0.39 0.57 
6 Sweden 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.23 N/A. 
7 France 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.36 
8 Spain 0.38 0.36 0.29 0.30 0.47 
9 Portugal 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.26 
10 Belgium 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27 
11 Austria 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.35 0.35 
Table 7: EU countries ranked by ratio of effective to statutory tax rate. 
 
It shows that in 1998 Italy, Finland, and Denmark are, along with Germany and the 
Netherlands, among the countries that seem to offer the least tax incentives or the 
highest tax enforcement, while Austria, Belgium, and Portugal are among the ones 
that provide the highest tax incentives or lowest tax enforcement. Another explanation 
is that companies located in countries presenting a low ratio might be able to better 
take advantage of tax planning and optimisation of foreign investment decisions. This 
                                                 
14  Even if part of the difference comes from the fact that the effective tax rates are computed on gross 
operating profit. Therefore, the level should not be interpreted per se.  
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picture holds with results for different years15 and roughly fits to the results of Buijink 
et al.16. 
e. Sectoral analysis. 
A more thorough descriptive analysis seems to indicate differences of effective 
taxation between sectors. Clearly the sectors "Energy and Water" and "Transport and 
Communication" seem to experience lower effective taxation, while "Trade" seems 
higher. The picture holds, with a few exceptions, for all the countries in the sample. 
These differences should be part of agenda for further research. Issues of degree of 
competition as well as the financial structure of companies should be considered. For 
example, one can expect the high level of tangible assets in the sectors of "energy and 
water" and "transport" to play a role through depreciation. 
EU average effective tax rates by sectors
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Figure 8: non weighted average and variance of effective tax rates by sectors in the EU sample for 
1990-1999 source: BACH. 
 
                                                 
15  Provided that the results for specific years depend on business cycle and specific events, one should 
look at trends. One exception is Finland which seems to reduce over time the difference between 
effective and statutory rates. 
 
16  Buijink et al (1999), Op. Cit., page 35. 
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f. Size 
The issue of size is also of importance. Indeed, Buijink et al. (1999) have already 
identified some reasons why size would matter17. On one hand, authorities may want 
to favour SMEs through their tax system since these are often seen as a major 
contributor to employment. These favourable treatments may range from reduced tax 
rates (e.g. Belgium has a progressive corporate tax rate) to specific allowances. 
Another reason why large companies would bear a higher taxation is that their actions 
are more closely watched and they would have less opportunities to escape taxation. 
On the other hand, one can argue that large companies, being large contributors in 
terms of jobs and tax revenues, have more power to negotiate favourable tax 
treatments, for example through professional unions. Furthermore, large companies 
are also the ones that can more easily mobilise fiscal engineering resources to avoid 
taxation, for example by developing specific financial structures or by pursuing tax 
planning abroad. A theoretical relationship between effective taxation and size does 
therefore exist, even though the sign of the correlation is not determined.  
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Figure 9: 1990-1999 Effective corporate taxation in manufacturing industry per country and size. 
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In the manufacturing sector, one can spot apparent tax differences between sizes for 
some countries. While in Finland, Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, Belgium and 
France, effective taxation is negatively correlated with size - i.e. small companies 
have a higher relative burden - the opposite seems to apply to Austria, Portugal, and 
Denmark.  
Country Ratio of effective rates of large 
companies on small ones. 
Sweden 0.55 
Finland 0.67 
Belgium 0.75 
France 0.81 
Japan 0.87 
Italy 0.95 
Spain 0.98 
Germany 1.02 
The Netherlands 1.04 
Denmark 1.52 
USA 1.61 
Portugal 1.86 
Austria 2.12 
Table 8: large versus small companies for manufacturing sector 1990-1999. 
 
With a few exceptions for specific sectors in specific countries, these relationships 
globally hold for other sectors. This indicates that size matters but the relationship 
between size and taxation vary amongst countries. This evidence is a potential source 
of a double discrimination: between companies of different sizes within one country 
and between companies of the same size in different countries. 
 
2.4. BACH effective corporate tax rates in perspective. 
 
Our study is part of the micro backward-looking approach. We follow the path taken 
in the first part of this paper to assess dispersion and ranking. To be able to compare 
studies18, we will only look at results for corporate taxation (putting aside shareholder 
personal taxation).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
17  Ibid.,  pages 28-29. 
18  With the necessary caveat on the different methods and data available. 
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We computed an EU-11 (15 minus Greece, Luxembourg, UK and Ireland) for all 
studies. This study shows an average effective tax rate slightly lower than other 
studies - which is due to the fact that, like macro studies, we computed tax rates on 
gross operating profit - but the dispersion is comparable to other studies. 
 
Study  
(period studied) 
Methodology 
 
Coefficient 
of 
dispersion 
Average effective 
corporate tax 
rate 
Sample size 
 
Nicodème  
(average 1990-1999) 
Micro 
Backward 
27% 14.3% 11 (sample) 
Buijink et al  
(average 1990-1996) 
Micro 
Backward 
25% 27.7% 11 (sample) 
Baker&McKenzie  
(1999) 
Micro 
Forward 
31% 25.7% 11 (sample) 
Pricewaterhousecoopers 
(1999) 
Micro 
Forward 
25% 33.5% 11 (sample) 
Martinez-Mongay 
 (1995) 
Macro 
Backward 
41% 20.0% 11 (sample) 
Table 9: Coefficient of dispersion and average effective corporate tax rate of some selected studies - 
results for sample of 11 BACH countries. 
 
As noted in the first section, the rankings are method-specific. This is confirmed by 
the fact that our ranking is correlated with the one found by Buijink et al. and not with 
the ones from other studies (except Pricewaterhousecoopers). 
 
Null hypothesis: independence in rankings with this study - sample size: 11. 
Study Method Spearman rho Conclusion 
Martinez 
(1997) 
Macro Backward 0.077 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.05 
Baker&McKenzie 
(1999) 
Micro Forward 0.420 Can't reject null 
hypothesis at 0.05 
PriceWaterhouse 
(1999) 
Micro Forward 0.713 Reject null hypothesis 
at 0.05 
Buijink et al. 
(1990-1996) 
Micro Backward 0.731 Reject null hypothesis 
at 0.05 
Table 10: Spearman test for this study. 
 
The differences and similarities between studies can be stressed within a table 
comparing high-taxed and low-taxed countries. We see that Germany, France, and 
Italy, are almost consistently in the higher range regarding corporate taxation. On the 
other hand, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Greece are in the lower range. 
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Corporate 
Effective 
taxation 
Martinez-
Mongay 
(1997) 
(macro 
backward) 
Buijink et al. 
(1999) 
(micro 
backward) 
Baker & Mc 
Kenzie (1999) 
(micro 
forward) 
PWC (1999) 
(micro 
forward) 
Nicodème 
(2001) 
(micro 
backward) 
High Taxed 
Countries 
Luxembourg 
UK 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
France 
Netherlands 
France 
Germany 
Spain 
 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Low taxed 
countries 
Greece 
Germany 
Austria 
Ireland 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Austria 
Greece 
Sweden 
Italy 
Finland 
 
Sweden 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Finland 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Table 11: high taxed and low taxed countries in different studies. 
(in italics, countries not surveyed in BACH). 
 34
Conclusions. 
Economic literature offers three types of methodologies to compute effective 
corporate tax rates. We named them the macro backward-looking, micro-backward-
looking, and micro forward-looking approaches. All methodologies show very 
different rankings and all present strengths and shortcomings. The macro backward-
looking methodology works on macroeconomic aggregate data. It allows deriving 
quickly effective rates but the level of aggregation sometimes makes it difficult to 
disentangle different sources for both tax paid and tax base. The micro forward-
looking approach derives effective taxation by looking at pre-tax and post-tax rates of 
return of hypothetical investments. It allows isolating the effects of specific tax codes' 
provisions but, when applied to the level of the firm as a whole, the method relies on 
somehow arbitrary assumptions. Further, the method does not take into account 
important elements of tax avoidance and tax evasion such as fraud or lack of 
enforcement. In this sense, it does not measure an observed tax burden. The micro 
backward-looking approach works with financial accounts of companies. It makes it 
possible to take into account all elements of taxation but nevertheless fails to discern 
precisely the different explanatory variables of effective taxation. Clearly, the choice 
of the method dramatically influences the ranking and dispersion of effective tax 
rates. 
 
We used this micro backward-looking approach to compute corporate effective tax 
rates for eleven European countries contained in BACH database, Japan, and the 
USA. Our analysis has brought interesting results. First, it shows that effective 
corporate taxation in Europe is not higher than in the US or in Japan. During most of 
the 90's, while increasing, the tax burden of European companies has consistently 
been lower than in the two other geographic areas. Our empirical findings also 
suggest that the business cycle might be a determinant of effective taxation. 
 
Second, comparing statutory and effective tax rates, one finds that from 1993 
onwards, these two measures have followed a different pattern for the European 
Union. The effect of lower statutory tax rates might have been counteracted by an 
increase of the tax base coupled with a favourable economic outlook. Dispersion of 
taxation in the EU has sharply declined in the beginning of the 90's because economic 
 35
slowdown has contracted profits. Nevertheless, dispersion remains stable the rest of 
the period indicating that tax reforms in Europe have followed a similar timespan.  
 
Our analysis also allows identifying high and low taxed countries with regards to 
corporate taxation. The first category includes Germany, Italy, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands while the second encompasses Austria and Sweden. The extent to which 
countries offer tax incentives or lower tax enforcement is partly captured by the 
comparison of statutory and corporate tax rates. According to this indicator, Austria, 
Belgium, and Portugal provide favourable treatment or are places where it is easier for 
their companies to optimise foreign investment decisions, while Italy, Finland, 
Germany, and Denmark offer few incentives or are places where these tax planning 
are more difficult to achieve. 
 
The analysis also indicates differences of taxation between sectors. "Energy and 
Water" and "Transport and Communications" enjoy lower effective taxation, while 
"trade" is clearly above. Finally, more favourable treatment for small companies 
compared to large ones in Austria, Portugal, and Denmark, with reverse situation in 
Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and France, indicates that the issue of size is of 
importance for a complete analysis. 
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Appendix 1: Baker & McKenzie's 1999 effective corporate tax rates. 
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Appendix 2: Martinez-Mongay's 1995 effective corporate tax rates. 
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Appendix 3: Buijink et al. 's 1990-1996 corporate effective tax rates. 
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Appendix 4: Sectoral grouping in BACH. 
Code Sector 
Former NACE sector codes New NACE sector codes 
1 ENERGY AND WATER* 11+12+13+14+15+16+17 10+11+12+23+40+41 
2 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 21+22+23+24+25+26+31+32+
33+34+35+36+37+41+42+43+
44+45+46+47+48+49 
 
13+14+15+16+17+18+19+20+
21+22+24+25+26+27+28+29+
30+31+32+33+34+35+36 
 
3 BUILDING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING 50 45 
4 TRADE 61+62+63+64+65+66 50.1+50.3+50.4+51+52.1-
52.6+50.5+55 
 
5 Transport and communication 71+72+73+74+75+76+77+79 60+61+62+63+64 
6 Other services n. e. s. 67+(83 à 98) 50.2+52.7+67+70+71+72+73+
74+75+80+85+90+91+92+93+
95 
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 Appendix 5: Evolution of corporate effective tax rates in the sector of "energy and water". 
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Appendix 6: Evolution of corporate effective tax rates in the sector of "Trade". 
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Appendix 7: Effective taxation by country, sector and size. 
Country High taxed Medium taxed Low taxed notes 
Austria   Yes 
Small companies as 
well as "energy and 
water", "building 
and civil 
engineering", and 
"transport and 
communication". 
 
Belgium  Yes, on average. Large companies  
"energy and water", 
"manufacturing", 
and "transport and 
communications". 
 
Denmark Yes, on average 
"energy and water". 
"manufacturing". "building and 
engineering". 
Small companies. 
Sectors "trade", 
"transport", and 
"other services" not 
available. 
Finland Small companies in 
"manufacturing" 
Yes, on average Large companies  
"energy and water", 
"manufacturing". 
Size disaggregation 
not always 
available. 
France Small companies in 
"energy and water". 
Yes, on average: 
low-intermediate 
taxation 
Large companies in 
"energy and water", 
and "transport and 
communication". 
 
Germany Yes.   Sectors "energy and 
water", "transport", 
and "other 
services" not 
available. No major 
differences 
regarding sizes. 
Italy Yes.   Large companies 
generally less taxed 
than small ones. 
Japan Yes.  Large companies 
for "other services". 
 
Portugal  Yes, on average. Small companies in 
"energy and water". 
Sectors "trade" and 
"other services" not 
available. Small 
usually less taxed 
than larger ones. 
Spain  Yes, on average: 
moving from 
intermediate to low 
taxation. 
Sector "transport 
and 
communication". 
 
Sweden   Yes, usually 
Large companies 
less taxed. 
 
The 
Netherlands 
Yes, usually    
USA Intermediate to 
high taxation. 
  Sectors "building 
and engineering", 
"transport", and 
"other services" not 
available. 
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Discussion of the table. 
 
The simplest case is Germany which is always among high tax countries for all 
sectors whatever the size of companies19. There does not seem to be large difference 
of treatment for different sizes in this country. The case of Italy is similar. Italy is 
among high tax countries for all sectors and all sizes. Large companies are taxed in 
the same way than others with the exception of the sectors "Energy and water", "Other 
services", and, to a lesser extent, "building and engineering". 
 
The Netherlands is also always situated in the upper range20. Differences of tax 
treatment for different sizes do not seem to be large, except for sector "building and 
civil engineering" and sector "other services", where small companies face a higher 
burden. Denmark is among high tax countries for the different sectors. Small 
companies enjoy a better tax situation in all three available sectors. 
 
At the lower end, Austria and Sweden compete for the lowest taxed country. They 
are in the low tax range for all sectors and all sizes21. In Austria, small companies 
have a favourable treatment but in sector "building and engineering" where the 
difference is less obvious. Sectors "energy and water", "building and engineering" and 
"transport and communication" are generally less taxed than other sectors. In Sweden, 
large companies enjoy a better treatment in all sectors, especially sectors "building 
and engineering", "trade" and "other services" where differences are large. Sectors 
"energy and water", "building and engineering" and "transport and communication" 
also enjoy low effective tax rates as a whole. 
 
The situation of France is more complex. France is in the intermediate group, except 
for sector "Energy and water"22 and sector "transport and communication"23 where it 
                                                 
19  The only exception is the sector "other services" for large companies. 
 
20  Except medium size companies in the sector "energy and water". 
 
21  Except Sweden for medium size companies in the sector "Building and Civil Engineering" (due to 
high effective rates in 93-95), and small size companies in sectors "Manufacturing" and "Other 
services" (for this latter sector, the result is influenced by the high effective tax rate in 1998, due to 
low gross operating profit). 
22  With high gross operating profit and low taxes in terms of turnover. 
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is among the lowest. These two results are mainly due to an extremely favourable 
treatment for large companies compared to other sizes in these sectors. In comparison, 
small companies in the sector of "energy and water" are among the highest taxed 
across countries. On average, large companies have a favourable treatment but this 
picture is mainly due to some sectors ("energy", "building", and "transport"), which 
are low tax sectors. 
 
The situation of Portugal is mixed. It belongs to low tax countries in the sector of 
"building and engineering" (whatever the size) and for small companies in general. 
Portugal is among the high tax countries for "transport and communication" but this 
hide a situation which is more favourable for larger companies than for smaller ones. 
The same can be said for "energy and water"24. On the whole, small companies enjoy 
a better tax situation especially in sector "energy and water" and "manufacturing". 
 
Belgium is below the average in all sectors25. Its advantage seems to derive especially 
from the sectors of "energy and water", "manufacturing industry" and "trade", while it 
has a (small) disadvantage in "building and engineering". This situation is especially 
true for large companies since effective taxation of small companies is in the average 
of the sample. Finland almost offers the same picture (with an additional advantage 
in the sector "other services"). Detailed results are only available for sectors "energy 
and water" and "manufacturing". No conclusion can therefore be definitively drawn. 
Finally, Spain has an advantage in "transport and communications" while the sector 
"trade" is highly taxed. The picture is influenced by large companies26. Recently, 
Spain is moving from intermediate to low effective taxed countries.                                                             
                                                                                                                                            
23  Idem. 
 
24  With zero effective taxation during 1990-1993. 
 
25  Except "Building and Engineering" where it is just above the average. 
 
26  The high taxation of large companies in the sector 6 is influenced by negative gross operating 
profits in 1993 and 1994. On the other hand, the sector of "transport and communication" shows 
very high gross operating surplus (about 40% of turnover) compared to other countries. 
 
